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Reflection and Perception in Professional Practice 
 





For the last decade, reflection has been a major theme in discussions about professional 
skillfulness and the development of the competence of practitioners such as nurses and teachers. 
The intellectual pattern that has structured ambitions in relation to reflection is found mainly in 
Schön’s (1983) The Reflective Practitioner and the epistemological turn suggested there. In this 
text, however, I focus on a dimension that is often forgotten when professional practitioners are 
conceived of as being reflective, namely, perception. From the framework of Merleau-Ponty, I 
argue that Schön’s theoretical account is highly problematic and that perception is the key to 






In the last decade reflection has been a major theme 
in discussions about professional skillfulness and the 
development of the competence of practitioners such 
as nurses and teachers. The intellectual pattern that 
has structured ambitions in relation to reflection is 
found mainly in Schön’s (1983) The Reflective 
Practitioner and the epistemological turn suggested 
there. This turn was influenced by Dewey (1938/ 
1998) as well as by Ryle (1949) and Polanyi (1967). 
In this famous text (as well as in the sequel Educating 
the Professional Practitioner; Schön, 1987), Schön 
argued for a way of recognizing the skillfulness of 
practitioners’ competence that was different from the 
traditional way in which this competence was 
recognized. Schön called for close analysis of 
practitioners’ work and social practice, and stressed 
the importance of including communication between 
participants as well as their artifact use in these 
analyses (Schön, 1983). 
 
Schön’s texts (1983, 1987) were very successful. In 
North America, they became standard reading for 
teacher educators soon after their publication 
(Grimmett & Erickson, 1988) and today Schön’s 
concept of ‘reflection-in-action’ generates 817 000 
hits when googled. In addition to being brought into 
discussions concerning practitioners’ competence, 
reflection and tacit knowledge (Erlandson, 2005, 
2006; Newman, 1999), Schön’s epistemological 
project has also influenced official doctrines 
concerning practitioner skillfulness. For example, 
Geerinck, Maschelin and Simons (2010) pointed out 
that in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD) reports, there is a link 
between Schön’s epistemology of reflection and the 
recognition of the professional competence of 
practitioners as an important factor for economic 
growth. Despite this popularity, Schön’s theories have 
been criticized over the years in relation to their 
scientific and philosophical aspirations. As Canning 
(2008) pointed out, this critique mainly concerns 
three major topics: First, the vagueness of the con-
ceptual structure in Schön’s theories; second, the 
possibilities for implementing these theories; and 
third, the social and political implications interwoven 
in the theories about the reflective practitioner.  
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In addition to Schönien perspectives, phenomeno-
logical approaches (van Manen, 1977, 1995), critical 
perspectives (Beach, 2005; Carr & Kemmis, 1986) 
and postmodern reasoning have also been extended 
into this area of research (Bleakley, 2000; Cavallaro 
Johnsson, 2002). In addition, action-related research 
has played quite an important role in this field. 
Ziechner’s practice-oriented views on reflection and 
practitioners’ work are an early example of action-
related research (Zeichner & Tabachinick, 1991). 
Within the caring sciences, Ekeberg (2007) has 
focused on didactics in relation to the learning 
process and Ghaye and colleagues (2008) from the 
Institute of Reflective Practice have argued for 
reflection as a strategy for doing both research and 
educational practice. 
 
Today, Schön’s texts The Reflective Practitioner 
(1983) and Educating the Reflective Practitioner 
(1987) are well known to almost every researcher in 
teacher education and nursery education. Grimmitt 
(1988) once argued that it is almost impossible to 
understand the problems and discussions on reflection 
without being familiar with the intellectual properties 
of Dewey. I think he was right. However, what was 
then applicable to Dewey’s famous How We Think 
(1911/1997) is applicable to Schön’s famous texts 
today. In a way, the field of reflective practice is 
theoretically interwoven with the legacy of Schön 
(whether for good or bad) and without proper 
understanding of Schön’s proposal, qualified research 
on reflection in teacher and nursery education is hard 
to produce. 
 
In this text I look at a dimension that is often 
forgotten when professional practitioners are 
conceived of as being reflective and this is the 
dimension of perception. I have mainly used Merleau-
Ponty’s theoretical framework (Merleau-Ponty, 
1942/1963, 1964/1968, 1945/2002), focusing on his 
seminal work Phenomenology of Perception (1945/ 
2002). However, my use of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is 
not at all rigorously phenomenological. Indeed, I 
avoid phenomenological language as much as 
possible, and try to show Merleau-Ponty’s point of 
view in a more straightforward linguistic form. From 
the framework established by Merleau-Ponty, I argue 
that Schön’s theoretical account is highly problematic 
and that perception is the key to shaping practitioners’ 
skillfulness.  
 
Schön’s Reflective Practitioner 
Schön’s Reflection Project  
 
The Reflective Practitioner revolves around 
practitioners’ competence. However, this theme is not 
a new one for Schön. As early as 1954, in his doctoral 
thesis entitled Rationality in the Practical Decision-
Process (Schön, 1954, cited in Newman, 1999), 
Schön explored similar themes. Later in his career, 
together with Argyris and Schön (1974), he launched 
the concept of ‘theory-in-use’. Schön’s fame, or 
rather the fame of his theories about practitioners’ 
competence, is however largely built on the concept 
‘reflection-in-action’, which he elaborated in The 
Reflective Practitioner (1983) and developed in the 
sequel Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987). 
  
Schön did not explore the epistemological question 
regarding the nature of knowledge. Instead, he turned 
to professional practices, where people are able to 
perform very specific and (often) highly advanced 
tasks, and instead asked questions such as: How do 
people become skillful (or in Schön’s terminology 
‘reflective’) practitioners? What characterizes skillful 
(‘reflective’) practitioners? Schön argued that the 
knowledge that structures and which is dignified by 
the universities (technical rationality) does not 
sufficiently describe the knowledge on which some 
professions’ skillfulness relies. The work of, for 
example, nurses, teachers, architects and therapists is 
formulated on tacit knowledge, which is a non-
verbalized, situated knowledge. Schön called this 
practice-oriented professional knowledge that a 
practitioner acquires during her/his schooling in a 
specific line of work ‘knowing-in-action’. Knowing-
in-action is one of the basic foundations for his 
‘reflection-in-action, which is the central concept that 
describes the action-oriented thinking that Schön 
claimed characterizes the work of practitioners. In 
Schön’s theories, the reflection concept(s) become(s) 
the conceptual hub for describing, analyzing and 
intertwining practitioners’ practical knowing, doing 
and thinking. 
 
Schön’s text The Reflective Practitioner (1983) is 
structured around examples from professional 
practice. The claims Schön made on behalf of 
reflection typically take their point of departure from 
these examples and are brought back to these 
examples. The best-known example is from an 
architect’s studio and revolves around the architecture 
student, Petra, and her teacher Quist (Schön himself 
returned to this example in the sequel Educating the 
Reflective Practitioner, 1987). Earlier, Schön (1983) 
described how Petra successively acquires an ability 
to solve architectural problems and how she develops 
a convergence of meaning with Quist about these 
problems by communicating with Quist and solving 
the problems together with him. Schön pointed out 
that the communication between Petra and Quist 
involves the use of tools and that it is therefore hardly 
meaningful to analyze only the spoken words when 
discussing the interaction between them (Erlandson & 
Beach, 2008; Schön, 1983).  
 
As Kindsella (2009) pointed out, Polany and, to an 
even greater extent, Ryle, seem to have had a strong 
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influence on Schön’s theories about the reflective 
practitioner. However, Dewey was undoubtedly the 
most influential for Schön and it was from him that 
Schön inherited his philosophical strategy. Like 
Dewey, Schön tried to generate new ways to conceive 
of a complex world by bringing different topics 
together while emphasizing the primacy of situated 
learning, where action, language and thinking are 
intertwined. Schön himself admitted his debt to 
Dewey in an essay from 1992, entitled The Theory of 
Inquiry: Dewey’s Legacy to Education.
1
 Schön wrote: 
  
When I was a graduate student at Harvard in 
the 1950s, my friend, Chester, urged me to 
read Dewey. But when I tried to do so, I found 
him muddy, and unintelligible. Later on  … I 
saw that Dewey’s was a generative muddiness: 
he was trying to say new things that were 
bound to seem muddy to anyone trained as I 
had been in the logical empiricism fashionable 
at the time (Schön, 1992, p. 123). 
 
In the same way as Dewey (1911/1997, 1938/1998), 
Schön tried to work his way out of the dominant 
traditions by inventing new ways of acknowledging 
practitioners’ knowing and skillfulness. The price he 
paid for his philosophical strategy was a lack of 
clarity. The Reflective Practitioner has (correctly in 
my view) often been accused of conceptual 
muddiness, which, as Geerinck et al. (2010) pointed 
out, makes it hard to analyze the claims Schön makes, 





Reflection-in-action – A Troublesome Theoretical 
Account  
 
If the vagueness in Schön’s theories constitutes a 
main line of criticism aimed at Schön’s texts, another 
main line involves Foucaultian tools and focuses on 
the social implications of the reflective practitioner as 
a discursive enterprise. To the best of my recollection, 
the first paper published in this discussion was 
entitled ‘The Body Disciplined’ (Erlandson, 2005) 
and established a discursive axis between the 
reflection idiom and the political steering of the 
teacher (see also Foucault, 1942/1991). Geerinck et 
al.’s (2010) critique followed a similar path, pointing 
out that even in the OECD’s (2005) reports the idiom 
                                                 
1 See Dewey (1911/1997, 1938/1998) and Tiles (1988) but 
also Burke (1998) for a discussion of the debate between 
Dewey and Russell on truth and action. 
2 To make the terminological confusion worse, Dewey is 
also incoherent when it comes to the use of terms. For 
example, in the discussions about reflection in How We 
Think, Dewey (1911/1997) sometimes uses the terms 
‘reflection’, ‘reflective thinking’ and ‘inquiry’ synonymous-
ly and sometimes not. 
about the reflective teacher has become a major way 
of conceiving of the work and profession of teachers. 
By means of reflection, teachers’ work will be 
beneficial for the European society. In addition, a 
third line of criticism, which I concentrate on in this 
article, focuses on the ontological and epistemological 
difficulties intertwined in Schön’s concept of 
reflection-in-action.  
 
The suspicion that there is something not quite right 
with Schön’s (1983) concept of reflection-in-action 
was raised soon after The Reflective Practitioner was 
first published. For example, in Grimmett and 
Erickson’s anthology from 1988, many objections 
aimed at the validity of Schön’s different reflections 
concepts were raised. For my purposes in this text, the 
most philosophically relevant critique of the concept 
of reflection-in-action was initiated by Newman in 
1999 and later developed by Erlandson (2005, 2006; 
Erlandson & Beach, 2008). This critique concerns the 
problem of behaviour/action and control in Schön’s 
analysis of practice and reflection, and points out that 
Schön, via the concept of reflection-in-action, 
employed a Cartesian thought-matrix (Erlandson, 
2005, 2006; Erlandson & Beach, 2008; Newman, 
1999). 
  
The critique is convincing but fairly complex. The 
first part of the argumentation states that in several 
examples that Schön used to demonstrate what he 
means by reflection-in-action, and how reflection-in-
action actually works in action, he indicated that 
reflection-in-action (in a broad sense) has the 
structure of something internal (a mind or a 
consciousness) steering something external (the body 
or/and bodily behaviour). Newman (1999) showed, 
via an analysis of Schön’s examples and Schön’s 
interpretations of these examples that Schön in his 
discussions about reflection-in-action becomes 
involved in Wittgenstein’s ‘private language’ 
argumentation and is contradicted by it (Newman, 
1999; Wittgenstein, 1953/1997). Now, one might 
raise the objection that it is doubtful whether 
Wittgenstein’s reasoning is applicable to Schön’s 
reasoning. However, in the second part of the 
argumentation, Erlandson showed in an analysis of 
Schön’s discussions and exemplifications, and of 
Newman’s reinterpretations and analysis of Schön’s 
reasoning, that even if one does not agree with 
Newman when it comes to whether or not the ‘private 
language’ discussion is applicable to Schön’s 
reasoning, it is still the case that Newman has 
detected an axis of control in Schön’s reasoning or, to 
put it differently, a control-matrix (Erlandson, 2005, 
2006). This control-matrix points toward a Cartesian 
universe. 
 
However, even if Schön has been criticized over the 
years and even if his theoretical account can be 
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questioned, Schön’s concept of reflection-in-action 
still generates more then 52 000 000 hits on google 
and his views on reflection, practice, and reflective 
practice remain dominant. There are several reasons 
for this continued dominance. First, Schön’s (1983) 
discussions in The Reflective Practitioner are indeed 
both interesting and illuminating. Second, his account 
has been interpreted by countless policymakers over 
many years and has been integrated into policy 
doctrines about teaching, teacher education and 
teacher professionalism since the late 1980s 
(Grimmett & Erickson, 1988; Erlandson, 2006). A 
third reason for the continuing dominance of the 
doctrine of the ‘reflective practitioner’ is simply that 
there have not been many competing philosophical 
views in education in subsequent years that still 
consider questions similar to Schön’s and that have 
also had a potential applicability for analyzing the 
professional practice of teachers (and/or nurses). 
Below, I try to present a view that can solve some of 
the difficulties apparent in Schön’s account, and that 
can also serve the purpose of establishing a 
framework for ambitions to outline new ways of 
recognizing and dealing with professional practice. 
For this purpose, I turn to Merleau-Ponty. 
 
Reflection as a Roundabout Way 
Reciprocity – An Organization Responding to the 
World  
 
In this text I can only present a small part of the 
argumentation for the ‘lived body’, as Merleau-
Ponty’s suggestion might be called, in contrast to the 
‘apparatus body’ (my term) that he criticizes. One 
aspect that I think is critical in order gain a firm grip 
on Merleau-Ponty’s suggestions is the idea of the 
movement behind being-in-the-world (être au monde) 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002). Merleau-Ponty’s best 
example of être au monde is effective, although not 
particularly tasteful: if an insect has a healthy leg 
removed it compensates for the limb’s movements, 
but this is not the case if a leg is merely tied. In the 
latter case, a free limb does not replace the tied one 
because “the current of activity which flows towards 
the world still passes through it” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/2002, p. 90). The insect is not a machine and 
therefore it is not a question of just replacing one part 
with another. Instead, the activity that interweaves the 
body with the world is interrupted. The insect’s 
instinct in this scenario is actually ineffective. An 
apparatus mode of reaction would have been to 
replace the dysfunctional limb with another one, and, 
in fact, this would also have been more effective. 
However, the insect responds as a lived body, as a 
mode of organization with the limb (and the current 
of activity) still intact and directed to the world. 
 
In this sense, the insect is structured by reciprocity 
with the world that is central for Merleau-Ponty’s 
thoughts about how lived bodies are organized. When 
we say that an animal exists, that it has a world, or 
that it belongs to a world, we do not mean that it has 
perception of the world or that it has consciousness of 
the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002). Merleau-
Ponty (1945/2002) continued: 
 
The situation which unleashes instinctive 
operations is not entirely articulate and 
determinate, its total meaning is not possessed, 
as is adequately shown by the mistakes and the 
blindness of instinct. It presents only a 
practical significance; it asks for only bodily 
recognition; it is experienced as an ‘open’ 
situation, and ‘requires’ the animal’s move-
ment, just as the first notes of a melody require 
a certain kind of resolution …. (p. 90) 
 
However, human beings are not insects, and while the 
insect’s reciprocity with the world is purely instinct-
based (“an a priori of the species and not a personal 
choice”; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 90), this is not 
the case for human beings. Our reciprocity is also 
driven by consciousness (without, however, being the 
same as consciousness). A central concept that 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) used to describe how we 
are aimed at the world, or rather, at certain poles of 
action offered in a particular situation, is the 
“intentional arc” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 122). 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) argued that through an 
intentional arc, conscious life, perceptual life, 
instincts and knowledge are carried, as well as at the 
past, future and the physical, ethical and socio-
cultural situation. On the intentional arc, intelligence, 
sensitivity and motor activity are united, and it ‘aims’ 
the subject as an existential-organic unity to a specific 
purpose or a specific goal within the systems of 
artifacts in which s/he is involved. An example 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) used is sewing, where the 
bench, scissors and pieces of leather “offer them-
selves to the subject as poles of action” (p. 122). This 
intentional arc, however, does not only concern our 
relation to physical artifacts but also to other people. 
  
In a clarifying example, Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) 
emphasized the lived body as a reciprocal unity, as an 
organization responding to others: 
 
When I motion my friend to come nearer, my 
intention is not a thought prepared within me 
and I do not perceive the signal in my body. I 
beckon across the world, I beckon over there 
where my friend is, the distance between us, 
his consent or refusal are immediately read in 
my gesture; there is not a perception followed 
by a movement, for both form a system which 
varies as a whole. If, for example, realizing 
that I am not going to be obeyed, I vary my 
gesture, we have here, not two distinct acts of 
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consciousness. What happens is that I see my 
partner’s unwillingness, and my gesture of 
impatience emerges from this situation without 
any intervening thought. (p. 127) 
 
In this example, the gesture exists in the world as part 
of a continuing meaningful relation that the ‘I’ has 
with his friend. S/he (via communication) responds to 
the offered ‘poles of action’. 
 
In a broader analytical mode, there are similarities 
between some of the claims that Schön made in his 
descriptions and Merleau-Ponty’s framework. For 
example, Schön’s emphasis on the ‘global character’ 
(Schön, 1983) of Quist’s competence definitively 
points in the same direction as Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1945/2002) ‘intentional arc’. Schön’s (1983) 
tendency to stress the global character of Quist’s 
competence also shows the influence of his 
predecessor Dewey, who Johnsson (1996) regarded as 
the most prominent embodiment philosopher besides 
Merleau-Ponty. However, it is also true that whereas 
Schön (1983) placed his trust in the possibilities of 
reflection, Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002) framework 
calls for a different analysis. 
 
Projecting the Lived Body 
 
In his analysis of the complexity of skillful human 
beings, Merleau-Ponty took his departure from a 
critique of Cartesianism and the duality between the 
internal/the soul/mind and the external/the body. 
More specifically, he challenged the two lines of 
explanation that are possible for defenders of 
Cartesian duality and defenders of ‘objective 
thought’, as Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) called the 
theoretical position of his main opponents. He 
demonstrated the devastating impact of the landscape 
of objective thought in philosophy and the 
behavioural sciences, as well as the main flaws of this 
position.  
 
The starting position is something like this: If the 
Cartesian duality is correct (as an ontological 
position) then the relation between body and 
soul/mind has to be described either in terms of 
‘physiology’ or in terms of ‘psychology’ (and 
possibly, and under certain conditions, as something 
in-between; Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, pp. 77–102). 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) then addressed the two 
lines of explanation individually and convincingly 
showed that neither the psychological nor the 
psychological explanation (even a hybrid explanation) 
is valid as a basis for understanding the life and 
function of the body (see Erlandson, 2006). Hence, 
Cartesian metaphysics is wrong. The life of the body 
cannot be understood in terms of only causality 
(cause and effect) but instead also needs to be 
understood in terms of organization. In this way, the 
totality goes beyond the sum of the parts and the brain 
is the seat of a “process of patterning” (mise en forme; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, p. 85).  
 
A famous example that Merleau-Ponty used in his 
reasoning is from the medical record of Schneider, a 
patient mutilated in the First World War. Although 
doubts have been raised regarding the validity of the 
medical records that Merleau-Ponty relied on for his 
examples, it is important to note that his argument is 
not reliant on the trustworthiness of these records, but 
that he merely uses them for illustrative purposes. In 
addition, Carman (2008) has provided contemporary 
support for Merleau-Ponty’s views. Schneider was 
partially brain-injured in a grenade explosion and was 
therefore functional in some ways but less functional 
in others. For example, he did not understand 
analogies such as ‘light is to lamp as heat is to stove’, 
or ‘eye is to light and color as ear is to sounds’ in a 
spontaneous manner, such as would be done by a 
normal person. Instead, Schneider managed to 
understand the analogies only when he had made 
them explicit by recourse to conceptual analysis.  
 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) pointed out that a person 
without Schneider’s injuries could also fail to 
understand the analogies, but for totally different 
reasons. For the normal person, if this person had 
similar education to Schneider, the explicit conceptual 
analysis would be the problem, not the direct 
understanding. “If we described analogy as the 
apperception of two given terms under a coordinating 
concept, we should be giving as normal a procedure 
which is exclusively pathological, and which 
represents the roundabout way in which the patient 
makes good the normal understanding of analogy” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, pp. 147–148). In other 
words, whereas the person without the injuries 
understands the analogies immediately but might not 
be able to analyze and explain them, Schneider 
learned to recognize these analogies by analyzing 
them. In other words, he used intellectual tools that, 
in this case, represent a roundabout way of 
understanding, a way that calls for reflection. We can 
now start to outline an account that differs from 
Schön’s theory about reflection (see Erlandson, 
2006). 
 
For Schön (1983), the virtuoso architect (or master 
architect), Quist, represented a pinnacle of reflection-
in-action: Quist moves with ease and grace in the 
architectural studio thanks to his reflection-in-action. 
However, according to Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) 
Schön’s (1983) description actually details a 
roundabout way for Quist to deal with the 
architectural work. According to Merleau-Ponty’s 
(1945/2002) account, Quist moves with such speed 
and grace because he does not have to reflect (think). 
Both Dahlin (2001) and Dall’Alba (2009) have made 
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similar points regarding Merleau-Ponty’s argument. 
Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002), Quist 
acts like ‘the normal person’ in the example using 
Schneider; he therefore immediately, or ‘directly’, 
recognizes what needs to be done (a point made by 
Erlandson, 2006). In contrast, the untrained architect 
like Petra, or a total novice in the architect’s line of 
work (such as a philosopher of education), needs to 
think in order to get the work done. Petra does not 
immediately understand the demands and the 
expectations interwoven in the work, and she does not 
know which action needs to be taken. She therefore 
has to think. The point is that, even if reflection-in-
action were a valid concept – which it is not, then it 
would be applicable to Petra’s behaviour in the 
architectural studio and not to Quist’s behaviour 
(Erlandson, 2006). 
 
Perceiving the World 
Perception and Action 
 
As I have pointed out, according to Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/2002), when we say that a human exists or that 
s/he has a world, we do not mean that s/he has a 
perception of the world or that s/he has consciousness 
of it but that s/he is in a reciprocal relationship with 
the world. To put it differently, as lived bodies, 
humans have a relation to the world, and this precedes 
our perception of the world. I believe it is helpful to 
understand this as awareness under the threshold of 
perception; as a feeling of tension from the world 
with which we are already interwoven. Through this 
undifferentiated awareness we are related to the world 





I think an example will help to make Merleau-Ponty’s 
point clear. If a child enters a dark room with a 
window open and mistakes a moving curtain for a 
robber, then it is not the case that the child sees the 
curtain but mistakes the curtain for a robber. It is also 
not the case that the child sees the curtain but 
confuses the category ‘curtain’ with the category 
‘robber’ (i.e., it is not a mistake in judgment). Instead, 
the shadow that the child becomes aware of as a 
movement in the darkness is perceived as a robber.  
 
Romdenh-Romluc (2011) pointed out that in a 
Merleau-Ponty account, “perception is the activity of 
bringing perceived properties into being, the 
awareness of the presence that we have at the limits 
of our perceptual reach is awareness of that bit of the 
world before perception of it taking place” (p. 127, 
emphasis in original). For Merleau-Ponty, perception 
                                                 
3 In this text I avoid using the term ‘experience’ for the 
simple reason that this concept calls for an article on its 
own. For an overview of experience from within a Merleau-
Ponty framework, I recommend Bengtsson (2013). 
is an act of letting undifferentiated awareness of the 
presence within perceptual reach, appear as 
something. Perception is an act of mediation by which 
the world takes shape in such a way that we can 
categorize it, understand it, talk about it, meditate 
over it, argue over it and act in it. 
 
However, as Romdenh-Romluc (2011) also pointed 
out, for Merleau-Ponty “perception as a movement 
from what is ambiguous and indeterminate to what is 
determine, squarely located in the shared world, and 
available to others … is aided by consciousness 
tendency to forget its own phenomena” (p. 18). For 
example, if I walk in the park one night and first only 
see ambiguous and diffuse shadows that after a while 
become visible as an alley of trees, I forget the 
indeterminate play of darkness and greyness that first 
occurred for me, and instead remember the alley of 
trees. It is not only the case that consciousness aids 
perception, but also that perception aids remembering 
(without, of course, being the same as remembering). 
This relationship between perception and memory is 
exemplified by the stories of the Flying Dutchman. In 
these stories terrified sailors cast out on a wild ocean 
experience hours and maybe days of storm, see a grey 
ship appear in the undifferentiated movements of 
water and shadows. In this way, memory clings to a 
piece of the world that is squarely located. Human 
beings are thus not conscious of their perception, they 
are conscious in their perception. 
 
As was highlighted earlier, for Merleau-Ponty action 
does not necessarily have anything to do with 
reflection in terms of thinking. Merleau-Ponty made a 
distinction between two kinds of action, labelled 
abstract action and concrete action, which may be 
clarifying. Raising an arm on command is an example 
of abstract action and walking home from a bus stop 
is an example of concrete action. Concrete actions are 
not the result of thinking but are instead related to 
how the potentialities for action are perceived, and 
they are structured with the help of motoric skills 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002). Having a motoric skill, 
in turn, means being able to do something in a 
specific situation. 
 
It is typical for motoric skills to involve a special kind 
of environment, as well as particular artifacts. The 
range of motoric skills is extensive, therefore 
scratching yourself is one example of a motoric skill 
and playing the piano is another, and these skills are 
acquired through practice (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/ 
2002). Acquiring a motoric skill is a matter of both 
learning to perceive the world in such a way that it is 
possible to exercise that particular motoric skill and 
learning to perceive opportunities to exercise the skill 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002). A conclusion of this 
reasoning is that from a perspective influenced by 
Merleau-Ponty, effective professional schooling 
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involves disciplining perception in ways that enable 
humans to perceive the environment and the working 
tools in a particular practice (blackboard and chart, 
computer programs etc.) in such ways that they are 
able to act effectively in that environment. 
  
When it comes to accounting for Quist in the 
architectural studio, he makes a perfect example of a 
professional who has learned to use concrete action as 
a basis for his professional behaviour. He has learned 
to use the potential of the architect’s studio, for 
example, the drawing table and the pen, in such a way 
that these tools in that particular environment have 
become “poles of action” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, 
p. 122; this is similar to the example of sewing given 
by Merleau-Ponty) and form part of Quist’s acquired 
motoric skills, much like the piano for the piano 
virtuoso. Gradually, Quist has learned to perceive the 
architect’s studio in such a way that it is possible to 
exercise the particular motoric skill of the architect. 
At the same time, he has learned to perceive 




Perception and Sociocultural Dependence  
 
Besides pointing in the direction of a potential need to 
form an alternative framework for conceptualizing 
practitioners’ professional action as “reflection/ 
reflective practice”, Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002) 
view on perception also opens up a discussion about 
social and historical dependence. The reason for this 
is that if perception is a process of mediation by 
which that which is ambiguous and indeterminate is 
given shape and located in the shared world, and the 
categorical and linguistic tools that come into use in 
perception via consciousness are partly culturally and 
socially dependent, then perception is culturally and 
socially dependent as well. 
  
The body is no more than an element in the 
system of the subject and his world, and the 
task to be performed elicits the necessary 
movements from him by a sort of remote 
attraction, as the phenomenological forces at 
work in my visual field elicits me, without any 
calculation on my part, the motor reactions 
which establish the most effective balance 
between them, or as conventions of our social 
group, or our set of listeners, immediately 
elicit from us the words, attitudes and tone 
which are fitting. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2002, 
p. 127) 
 
In the quotation above, Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) 
made it clear both that perception is a part of the 
subject as a system and that this system is interwoven 
not only with the physical but also social and cultural 
environments. Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) is thus far 
from representing the solipsistic worldview of which 
his contemporary in France, Jean-Paul Sartre (1943/ 
1992) has, in my view correctly, been accused. For 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/ 2002), a human being and her 
environment are necessarily and intimately inter-
twined and are constantly changing. Perception is a 
naturally occurring tool that is offered as a life 
resource that calls to be used, and to be related to the 
world, in specific ways. (As an aside, based on this 
interpretation, it is possible to argue that there is an 
obvious lineage from Merleau-Ponty to the micro-
sociological approach of Garfinkel, 1967.) We 
become tuned in relation to environments that we 
become familiar with, and tend to perceive and act in 
relation to the demands and possibilities offered in 
that environment. 
 
However, by recognizing perception as partly 
culturally and socially conditioned, Merleau-Ponty 
(1945/2002) also pointed toward a cultural and 
political vulnerability for human beings that is seldom 
emphasized by phenomenologists, but which seems to 
have had a profound impact on Merleau-Ponty’s most 
well-known student, Foucault. A logical basis for 
Foucault’s concept of ‘discipline’, for example, is the 
recognition of a fundamental intransparency in human 
self-relations. It becomes possible for human beings 
to understand and analyze themselves via the use of 
external intellectual recourses. As a consequence, 
regulating and steering the self-mediating tools (the 
means by which self-understanding is formed and 
executed) involves regulating and steering the forms 
of subjectivity in a society (Erlandson, 2005; 
Foucault, 1942/1991; Geerinck et al., 2010; Rose, 
1999). 
 
We should here take into consideration Foucault’s 
development as a philosopher. This development is 
apparent from the early Madness and Civilization 
(1961/1973), where he more or less proclaimed the 
death of subjectivity, until he wrote in the preface to 
the later The Use of Pleasure – The History of 
Sexuality: II (1984/1985): “It appeared that I now had 
to undertake a third shift, in order to analyze what is 
termed ‘the subject’. It seemed appropriate to look for 
the forms and modalities of the relation to self by 
which the individual constitutes and recognizes 
himself qua subject” (Foucault, 1984/1985, p. 6, 
emphasis in original). As Deleuze (1988) pointed out, 
this later position of Foucault brought him close to his 
old teacher Merleau-Ponty. In this later view, self-
relations are indirect, a result of historically, 
politically and socio-culturally situated action that 
offers the resources (and the limitations and 
possibilities) for the affective self-constitution of the 
lived body’s potentialities (Foucault, 1984/1985; see 
also Geerinck et al., 2010). 
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That means that it is possible to trace some of the 
foundations of Foucault’s logic of self-mediation 
back to the thoughts of his old teacher Merleau-Ponty. 
The critique on the reflective practitioner formulated 
by, for example, Erlandson (2005; see also Erlandson, 
2006, for an analysis on the logic of self-mediation in 
Foucault) and Geerinck et al. (2010), appears to adopt 
Foucaultian perspectives and could therefore also be 
linked to Merleau-Ponty’s ideas. Additionally, for a 
discussion committed to corporal subjectivity within a 
Merleau-Ponty framework, see O'Loughlin (1997). 
 
 
The Place for Reflection 
Perception and Reflection  
 
Schön’s (1983) account forces reflection (or, in a 
broad sense, thinking) back into the actions of Quist, 
when the whole point with Quist’s being experienced 
in this field was to reduce unnecessary thinking on his 
part. Of course, thinking has its place. Keeping in 
mind the character of this article, claiming anything 
different would indeed be strange. However, Dewey 
has pointed out that obstacles for action are what 
trigger reflection. We do not deal with our complex 
everyday life by thinking g of every aspect of it all the 
time. We therefore do not think about things such as 
whether we are short enough to pass through a certain 
doorway or have long enough legs to climb a certain 
stairway. Instead, we deal with our complex everyday 
life by thinking only when we have to. 
  
Merleau-Ponty’s (1945/2002) way of viewing 
perception as a partly socio-culturally conditioned 
activity, by which the lived body relates to the 
environment in such a way that it becomes possible to 
employ motoric skills, is an alternative to Schön’s 
(1983) reflection ideas. Schön’s (1983) account puts 
emphasis on reflection and thinking as a driving force 
for skillful action (which explains the term reflection-
in-action in the first place), while perception is key in 
Merleau-Ponty’s account. We successively become 
tuned to an environment; we learn to deal with it, 
execute action in it, and live in it. Thus, like virtuosos 
of our life-worlds, we shop, brush our teeth and pass 
in and out of doorways without too much difficulty 
and without too much thinking. We also use everyday 
artifacts that are incorporated into these everyday-
world environments in much the same way. We can 
therefore turn the sheets of paper in the Sunday 
newspaper, or flick through an iPad without 
intellectual effort. This is a matter of training and 
repetition. We learn a bodily behaviour that answers 
to the calls from our environment that we have 
learned to perceive in a specific way. We are not 
conscious of how we perceive things; there is no 
consciousness inside (or within) our consciousness by 
which we perceive how we perceive. 
 
The point in training to be an architect, or a nurse, or 
a teacher, is to be able to have an ‘every day relation’, 
or in other words a familiar relation, to our 
environment as much as possible. Most often 
professional practice is about training perception and 
learning to respond with the appropriate action to the 
demands and possibilities offered in a particular 
situation. We do not want emergency nurses who 
think about socio-cultural theories about artifact use 
when putting a needle in a patient’s arm. We do not 
want teachers that contemplate Ryle’s distinction 
between knowing that and knowing how when 
mediating in a classroom conflict between two 
eleven-year-old boys. Experienced practitioners are 
experienced owing to the fact that they have acquired 
certain ways to perceive things. They have a trained 
perception. 
 
Discipline and Critique 
 
Besides being a troublesome concept in accounting 
for human action, the muddiness in Schön’s (1983) 
conceptualizations is one of the most common 
criticisms aimed at his enterprise. Everything tends to 
be reflection in one way or another (Canning, 2008; 
Erlandson, 2005; Grimmett & Erickson, 1988). In 
Schön’s theoretical account, the concept reflection-in-
action becomes a conceptual veil that hides 
differences of different kinds. Apart from the obvious 
problems (for instance, the lack of conceptual 
coherence makes it hard to use Schön’s account as a 
basis for theoretical analyses, for empirical research 
on professional practice, as well as for developing 
practice), over-usage of reflection also tends to 
diminish the importance of reflection in situations 
where it should be valued. In a way, reflection-in-
action incorporates two different modi, two different 
kinds, in a human being’s repertoire, perception and 
reflection, and collapses the difference between them. 
However, at the same time the difference between 
effective and critical is also collapsed, as well as the 
difference between following a practice and 
recreating a new practice (or a new way to view a 
practice). 
 
Humans are able to be effective by perceiving the 
environment in a practice according to praxis, and 
therefore to work according to the lines of that 
practice, and, when well trained, without too much 
intellectual effort. However, we are also able to read 
and learn about that practice, to attach it to political 
ideas, to reflect on it and its ethical standards. We are 
able to reflect upon ourselves as parts of it and to 
challenge it. I think a fruitful way to see this is that 
the dressage on the subject’s perception cannot be 
limitless. There is also an actual phenomenon that 
appears for the subject, whether that is a wooden 
chair or heavy social injustice. For example, the child 
who has been schooled in watching out for robbers 
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may tend to perceive a movement in a dark room as a 
robber. Still, if it is actually a curtain that gives rise to 
the movement in the room and not a robber, the 
child’s perception will change: The movement will 
eventually be seen as a curtain instead of a robber. In 
educational matters, due to their complexity, more 
powerful resources are called for in order to establish 
a change in perspective. This is the environment for 
reflection (see for example Bengtsson, 1995). 
 
There is always a need for reflection in its ‘classical’ 
sense; such as thinking about matters of life, of 
politics, of power, and of the social and instrumental 
environment that make people act and think in certain 
ways. (For example, as a suggestion and with 
pragmatic theory as a framework, Dewey (1911/1997, 
pp. 2-10) established in How We Think that reflection 
as a distinct order of thinking is systematic, is aimed 
at gaining knowledge, is critical and leads to action). 
Even if introspective movements are impossible from 
a Merleau-Ponty point of view, the resources that are 
offered to us as tools for self-subjection are indeed 
open for investigation, and therefore also for 
reflection. It is here that philosophers of education 
find their role; philosophers of education are not in 
the business of dressage, but in the business of 
creative and critical thinking. It is also here that 
reflection becomes urgent for teachers. In their work, 
teachers certainly need to look at social and political 
life, steering mechanisms and strategies, and the 
consequences of certain political decisions. This kind 
of reflection is only indirectly related to actual teacher 
practice in the classroom, but has a large long term 
impact on that practice. From a Merleau-Ponty 
perspective, it is possible to argue that reflection in a 
broad sense can be used to restructure the resources 
that mediate perception of professional practice and 
that it is therefore a valuable tool for professional 
practitioners. 
 
From the perspective of Merleau-Ponty (but also of 
classical thinkers and authors of the existential 
philosophical tradition, like Dostoyevsky, 1866/2008, 
or Camus, 1947/2001) one could claim that while 
becoming a skillful and effective practitioner is a 
question of training and disciplining perception, 
reflection, much like bildung, serves a different 
purpose. This purpose is not necessarily to incline 
humans to become more effective as legitimate 
participants in a social practice, but instead to become 
more critical, and consequently perhaps less effective. 
The training to becoming a skillful participant in a 
practice could very well contradict the reflective 
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